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NOTES AND COMMENTS
PUBLIC SCHOOL SEGREGATION:
DOES THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT REQUIRE
AFFIRMATIVE INTFGRATION?
NEW R OCHELLE DECISION
The question of so-called "de facto segregation", or the predominance
of Negro students in a school due not to legal factors but rather due to the
concentration of Negro population living in the neighborhood, has been a
169
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matter of increasing interest to the N. A. A. C. P. in the last several years.'
In the recent case of Taylor v. Board of Education of the City of New
Rochelle,2 a federal court for the first time condemned a school board for
"de facto segregation" based on the factual finding that the district lines
of a school with a predominantly Negro student body were drawn with the
object of segregating Negro students and that the continuation of such
initial gerrymandering was impelled by the same motivation. However,
the district court also held the Fourteenth Amendment contains a require-
ment for affirmative integration, and that whenever a neighborhood school
becomes overwhelmingly Negro, even though through the influx of Negroes
into the neighborhood, this amounts to segregation in fact, and imposes a
duty upon the school board to integrate students by altering school district
lines or permitting transfers to schools outside the district. This comment
will discuss the legal aspects of this novel decision.
The facts as found by the district judge were that in 1898, before the
City of New Rochelle, a suburb of New York City, had any Negro residents,
Lincoln School was built. By 1930, due to an influx of Negroes into the
Lincoln School district area, a majority of Negro students were attending
that school.
From that time to 1961 the district lines of the Lincoln district were
adjusted to enclose only the growing Negro residential area and exclude
white communities without regard to their proximity to the school building.
The only justification expressed was that the school, being a Negro school
should be utilized by the Negro community as a meeting place after regular
school hours. Those isolated white pupils who resided within the district
were allowed to transfer to adjoining schools up until 1949, when the
students in attendance were 100 percent Negro. In that year the transfer
policy ended. The termination of the transfer policy resulted in white
residents leaving the district, and the district and neighborhood became all
Negro. During the eleven years between 1949 and 1960, although a few
white residents returned to the area, the school board was subjected to
numerous pressures, demands and complaints from various organizations
alleging that the situation was one of harmful racial imbalance which was
detrimental to the education the Negro pupils were obtaining.3
In 1957, the "Dodson Report" was issued. The report recommended
that the Lincoln School be rebuilt as a larger school, that the neighborhood
1 Greenberg, Race Relations and American Law, at 249-255 (1959).
2 191 F. Supp. 181 (S. D. N. Y. 1961), appeal dismissed, 288 F. 2d 600 (2d Cir.
1961), 195 F. Supp. 231 (S. D. N. Y. 1961), aff'd., 294 F. 2d 36 (2d Cir. 1961), stay
denied, 82 Sup. Ct. 10, cert. denied, 7 L. Ed. 2d 339, 82 Sup. Ct. 382 (1961).
3 Supra note 2, 191 F. Supp. 181.
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school policy be less rigidly enforced, and that there be extensive redistrict-
ing. The aim of the recommendation was to offer a comprehensive plan to
desegregate the Lincoln School by enlarging the school to accommodate
nearby white residents as well as the Negro population. However, the
board secured funds to build a smaller school which was sufficient only
for the predominantly Negro enrollment.
4
In 1960, the Lincoln student body was 94 percent Negro; however
two thirds of all the Negro elementary school pupils were attending other
New Rochelle schools which were predominantly white. The high schools in
the city were fully integrated.
An action was brought by eleven Negro pupils, to enjoin the construc-
tion of the new school and to enjoin the board from refusing to allow these
students to register other than in Lincoln, and from requiring them to
register at Lincoln, in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York against the New Rochelle School Board. The plain-
tiff pupils alleged that the school board had deliberately created and
maintained a racially segregated school, thus violating the Fourteenth
Amendment and the principles enunciated in Brown v. Board of Education.5
Judge Irving Kaufman, in deciding the case, held that the board,
prior to 1949, had intentionally created the school as a racially segregated
school by gerrymandering the district lines and by transfers of white
children out of predominantly Negro schools.
He further held that in maintaining the same school boundaries and
a rigid neighborhood school policy whereby the students residing within
each district were required to attend the school within that district except
in extraordinary circumstances the school board had failed to implement
in good faith the principles enunciated in Brown v. Board of Education
requiring a racially desegregated school policy.
However, Judge Kaufman went on to condemn the neighborhood school
policy when such policy results in the necessity of Negroes attending
schools which are predominantly Negro. He declared that "The neighbor-
hood school policy certainly is not sacrosanct . . . It cannot be used as an
instrument to confine Negroes within an area artificially delineated in the
first instance by official acts." 6
Of even more significance was his decision that permitting Negroes
to transfer out of these schools when other students lacked the same
4 Id. at 196.
5 349 U. S. 294 (1955).
8 Supra note 2, 191 P. Supp. 181, at 195.
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privilege was not a denial of equal protection of the law. Thus, the school
board argued that ". . . it would be violative of the law to accord Negroes
special privileges not allowed to other minority groups." It pointed to
the fact that several other elementary schools in New Rochelle have student
bodies which are primarily of one religious or national origin group and
argued that "... if permissive zoning privileges were afforded to the
Lincoln pupils, the same privileges would have to be given to these other
minorities." It concluded that such wholesale permissive transferring
would produce chaos in the school system.
The district judge first noted that no other ethnic groups were cur-
rently seeking transfers. However, he went on to hold:
"The Constitution is not this color-blind. The Brown decision dealt
only with Negroes; it was based on factual findings which may not be
applicable to other minority groups. . . . There are instances where it
is not only justified, but necessary, to provide for such allegedly
'unequal treatment' in order to achieve the equality guaranteed by
the Constitution. '7
After a premature appeal to the Court of Appeals, which was dis-
missed,8 the district judge ordered the school board to permit all pupils
to transfer from Lincoln School to other schools at will. 9 This privilege
has in fact been exercised by a majority of the students there, denuding the
Lincoln School and overcrowding the surrounding schools. 10
On appeal, two judges out of a three judge Second Circuit panel
affirmed the district judge's decision on the basis of intentional gerry-
mandering of the Lincoln School." In a lengthy and forceful dissent,
Judge Moore first pointed out that the record was devoid of any competent
evidence of original segregation, gerrymandering, or other intentional dis-
tricting motivated by racial considerations prior to 1949,12 and that the
school board's failure to affirmatively integrate the Lincoln School after
1949 might have been motivated by any number of valid non-racial con-
siderations.13 Asserting that there was no affirmative duty to decree
7 Id. at 196.
8 Supra note 2, 288 F. 2d 600.
9 Supra note 2, 195 F. Supp. 231.
10 Out of 485 Lincoln pupils the parents of 350 requested transfers. N. Y. Times,
June 15, 1961, p. 37, col. 1. In the end 267 pupils were transferred by the board,
leaving only 187. The percentage of Negroes fell from 94% to 90%. N. Y. Times,
Sept. 7, 1961, p. 29 col. 1.
11 Supra note 2, 294 F. 2d 36.
12 Id. at 46 (Moore, J., Dissenting).
13 Id. at 48.
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"enforced integration and compulsory racial mixture according to Federal
court formula in every city and hamlet of the country, "14 Judge Moore
also condemned the preference being shown to Negro students in Lincoln
School. 15 He concluded that ". . . the effect and implications of the
decision below are to place the operation of the schools in the hands of
the Federal courts or a single judge."6
Although the denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court was, as usual,
without opinion, 17 Justice Brennan's memorandum in refusing a stay
clearly indicated that the denial was based on the narrow finding of fact
below.' 8  Accordingly, the twin questions decided below, whether there is
an affirmative duty to integrate, and whether this duty is imposed only in
favor of Negroes, by tl-eFourteenth Amendment, remains open.
PRE-BROWN DECISIONS AND THE BROWN DOCTRINE
The legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment shows that it
was not intended to affect the then prevailing racial segregation in public
schools. 19 All of the early cases which discussed the Fourteenth Amend-
ment specifically held that school segregation was not unconstitutional, 20
and even those few state cases which forbade segregation did so based on
particular statutes and not on the federal constitution. 21  Indeed, the
"separate but equal" doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson;2 had even Mr. Justice
Harlan's approval in Cummings v. County Board of Education23 when
14 Id. at 51.
15 Id. at 50.
16 Ibid.
17 Supra note 2, 7 L. Ed. 2d 339, 82 Sup. Ct. 382.
Is Supra note 2, 82 Sup. Ct. 10.
19 Avins, Review, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 428, at 430-1 (1958). See also Bickel, The
Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1955).
20 Bertonneau v. Board of Directors of City Schools, 3 Fed. Cas. 294 (1878)
Tape v. Hurley, 66 Cal. 473, 6 Pac. 129 (1885) ; Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36 (1874)
Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327 (1874) ; Roberts v. Louisville School Board. 95 Ky. 621,
26 S. W. 814 (1894) ; Chilton v. St. Louis & T. M. Ry. Co., 114 Mo. 88, 21 S. W.
457 (1893) ; State v. Duffy, 7 Nev. 342 (1872) ; People v. Gallager, 93 N. Y. 438
(1883); Dallas v. Fosdick, 40 How. Pr. 249 (N. Y. 1869); McMillan v. School
Committee, 107 N. C. 609, 12 S. E. 330 (1890) ; State v. Board of Education of Cincin-
nati, 7 Ohio Dec. Reprint 129 (1876) ; State v. McCann, 21 Ohio St. 198 (1871) ;
Martin v. Board of Education of Morgan County, 42 W. Va. 514, 26 S. E. 348 (1896).
21 Wysinger v. Crookshank, 82 Cal. 588, 23 Pac. 54 (1890) ; People v. Board of
Education, 127 Ill. 613, 21 N. E. 187 (1889) ; Chase v. Stephenson, 71 Ill. 383 (1874) ;
Ottawa Board of Education v. Tinnon, 26 Kan. 1 (1881) ; Pierce v. Union District
School Trustees, 46 N. J. L. 76 (1884) ; People v. Board of Education of Detroit,
18 Mich. 400 (1869) ; Kaine v. Commonwealth, 101 Pa. 490 (1882).
22 163 U. S. 537 (1896).
23 175 U. S. 528 (1899).
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applied to public schools, and Mr. Justice Holmes' approval in Berea
College v. Kentucky 4 when applied to private schools.
Brown v. Board of Education25 ended the "separate but equal" doc-
trine in education. In this case, the Supreme Court required school boards
to shift to a non-racial school districting policy. No consideration was
henceforth to be given to the racial background of the student. In the
only other Supreme Court decision, Cooper v. Aaron,26 this doctrine was
reaffirmed. Indeed, Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham27 underlines the limited
scope of the Brown doctrine by permitting pupil placement and assign-
ment based on a wide variety of non-racial factors.
AFFIRMATIVE DUTY TO INTEGRATE
Lower court cases have been in accord that there is no affirmative
duty to integrate. In Briggs v. Elliott,2s one of the cases that was re-
manded by the Brown decision, the court therein stated:
". .. It is important that we point out exactly what the Supreme
Court has decided and what it has not decided in this case. It has
not decided that the Federal Courts are to take over or regulate the
public schools of the states. It has not decided that the states must mix
persons of different races in the schools or must require them to attend
schools or must deprive them of the right of choosing the schools they
attend. What it has decided, and all that it has decided is that a state
may not deny to any person on account of his race the right to attend
any school that it maintains. This, under the decision of the Supreme
Court, the state may not do directly or indirectly; but if the schools
which it maintains are open to children of all races, no violation of the
constitution is involved, even though the children of different races
voluntarily attend different schools, as they attend different churches.
Nothing in the Constitution or in the decision of the Supreme Court
takes away from the people freedom to choose the schools they attend.
The Constitution, in other words, does not require integration. It
merely forbids discrimination. It does not forbid such segregation
as occurs as the result of voluntary action. It merely forbids the use
of governmental power to enforce segregation. The Fourteenth
Amendment is a limitation upon the exercise of power by the state or
state agencies, not a limitation upon the freedom of individuals. "29
24 211 U. S. 45 (1908).
25347 U. S. 483 (1954).
26358 U. S. 1 (1958).
27 358 U. S. 101 (1958).
28 132 F. Supp. 776 (E. D. S. C. 1955).
29 Id. at 777.
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In Rippy v. Borders,3 0 the Fifth Circuit disagreed with a District
Court's decision in a school segregation case wherein part of its decree
enjoined the defendants from "requiring or permitting segregation in any
school under their supervision." The Court of Appeals declared as
follows:
"We have emphasized the words 'or permitting segregation of the
races' in the District Court's order because that expression might
indicate a serious misconception of the applicable law and of the
mandate of this court. Our mandate ... had been carefully limited so
as to direct the entry of a judgment restraining and enjoining the
defendants from requiring segregation of the races in any school under
their supervision. Likewise in our opinion, we had pointed out that
it is only racially discriminatory segregation in the public schools
which is forbidden by the Constitution. That point was emphasized
in the Arlington, Virginia Case, in which Chief Justice Parker of the
Fourth Circuit quoted with approval the apt language of the District
Judge Bryan: 'It must be remembered that the decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States in Brown v. Board of Education,
• . . do not compel the mixing of the different races in the public
schools. No general reshuffling of the pupils in any school system has
been commanded. The order of the court is simply that no child shall
be denied admission to a school on the basis of race or color. Indeed,
just so a child is not through any form of compulsion or pressure re-
quired to stay in a certain school, or denied transfer to another school,
because of race or color, the school heads may allow the pupil, whether
white or Negro, to go to the same school as he would have attended in
the absence of the ruling of the Supreme Court. Consequently, com-
pliance with that ruling may well not necessitate such extensive
changes in the school system as some anticipate.' "
The above statements were approved and followed in Avery v. Wichita
Falls Independent School District,31 wherein an action for a declaratory
judgment was brought based on the assumption that the plaintiffs were
entitled to attend the public elementary schools nearest their respective
homes without distinction as to their race or color. The court succinctly
stated "The constitution as construed in the school segregation cases . . .
forbids any state action requiring segregation of children in public schools
solely on account of race; it does not, however, require actual integration
of the races."
30 250 F. 2d 690, 692-3 (5 Cir., 1957).
31 241 F. 2d 230, 233 (5th Cir. 1957).
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Under these authorities the constitutional proscription of the use of
state or local power to enforce segregation cannot be extended so as to
hold or imply a constitutional compulsion to create integration. 32
In answering the general question the problem has also arisen as to
whether the construction of a new school in a predominantly all Negro
or all white area could be enjoined. In Sealy v. Department of Public
Instruction,33 a school district comprised two non-contiguous areas by
reason of the division of the township. Before any litigation was instituted
the junior high school serving both of these areas was located in the
southern portion of the township. The Board of Education was about to
abandon the old school and construct a new school. The location of the new
school would be in the upper section, a predominantly white area, though
the school was to serve both white and Negro students. An action was
brought to enjoin the construction of the school on the ground that the
selection of the site amounted to discrimination. The court refused the ap-
plication. The Board in reaching its decision regarding the site had taken
into account the influx of school age population, requirements of school
facilities, the population census of both districts, a projection of the school
population, and the consideration that many students now attending
private schools would attend the public school upon the completion of
the new school. The court decided that the plaintiff's complaint rested
primarily on inconvenience, and made the following statement regarding
the discretion lodged in the school board :
"'It may well be that the final determination is not the best site that
could be selected, but this court has no authority to review the actions
of the local school authorities in selecting a site for the location of the
school, since the location of the school is primarily a question to be
decided by the Local Board of School Directors, and even a state
court could only interfere when there is such a manifest abuse in the
action of the board as amounts to arbitrary will and caprice." 3 4
The lower court's opinion was affirmed on appeal, and the appellate
court also commented as follows upon the discretion of the school board:
"The location of the schools assuredly is one for state school authorities
32 Boston v. Rippey, 275 F. 2d 850 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 352 U. S. 878
(1960), rev'd. and reman'd., 285 F. 2d 43 (5th Cir. 1960); City of Montgomery,
Alabama v. Gilmore, 176 F. Supp. 776 (N. D. Ala. 1959), modified and aff'd., 277
F. 2d 364 (5th Cir. 1960) ; Allen v. County School Board of Prince Edward County,
Va., 164 F. Supp. 786 (E. D. Vir. 1958), rev'd. and reman'd., 249 F. 2d 462 (4th
Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U. S. 953 (1958).
33 159 F. Supp. 561 (E. D. Penn. 1957), aff'd., 252 F. 2d 898 (3rd Cir. 1958), cert.
denied, 356 U. S. 875 (1958).
34 Supra note 33, 159 F. Supp. 561, at 565.
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and local school boards; for state, not national courts, unless there be a
deprivation of rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.' *5 Thus,
it would conclusively appear that the mere choice of a location for a
school, though it be in a predominantly all white or all Negro neighbor-
hood, rests in the discretion of the school board.38
The legitimately administered "neighborhood school" policy was given
absolute and unequivocal approval in the Michigan case of Henry v.
Godsell.3 7 The plaintiff claimed that the construction of a new school
in an area occupied almost exclusively by Negroes, the modification of
attendance areas so that the population of certain schools was almost
all Negro, and the subsequent refusal to permit plaintiff to attend a public
school of her own choice, disregarding the attendance area in which she
lived, constituted a violation of the Civil Rights Act. The court dismissed
the complaint and approved the neighborhood school policy by making
the following statements:
"The school board has a duty to provide educational facilities to all
children without regard to their color. If it builds schools in areas
where need exists, without arbitrarily fixing attendance areas to
exclude any given segment of the school population, it is carrying
out that duty."
"The fact that in a given area a school is populated almost exclusively
by children of a given race is not of itself evidence of discrimination.
The choice of a school site based on density, accessibility, ease of
transportation, and other safety considerations, is a permissible exer-
cise of administrative discretion.' '3
The plaintiff also contended that the attendance areas in the school
districts had been altered to compel or effectuate a plan of segregation.
35 Supra note 33, 252 F. 2d 898, at 901.
36 Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 162 F. Supp. 372 (N. D. Ala. 1958), aff'd. per
curiam, 358 U. S. 101 (1958). The court stated they would not consider the possible
unconstitutional application of the law providing for the transfer of students; the
court will assume that the board will act in a non-discriminatory manner in the
carrying out of transfers unless there is a positive showing of purposeful segrega-
tion. See also: Carson v. Warlick, 227 F. 2d 789 (4th Cir. 1955), mandamus denied,
238 F. 2d 724 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U. S. 910 (1957) ; Holland v. Board
of Public Instruction, 258 F. 2d 730 (5th Cir. 1958). The Holland case holds that
the Fourteenth Amendment does not speak in positive terms to command Integra-
tion, but negatively to prohibit governmentally enforced segregation. An infant
colored child was entitled to be treated simply as another school child without
regard to his race or color, and the fact that he was Negro did not vest him with
the right to attend a school located in a district in which he did not reside when
that geographical rule was being applied to all children alike.
37 165 F. Supp. 87 (E. D. Mich. 1958).
38 Id. at 90.
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The court held that the contention lacked merit and said: "In the absence
of a showing that the attendance areas have been arbitrarily fixed or con-
toured for the purpose of including or excluding families or a particular
race, the Board of Education is free to establish such areas for the best
utilization of its educational facilities. "89
The court also found that the transfer of some students to schools
outside their particular residential district was not for purposes of segre-
gation. "A few students, because of special circumstances, are permitted
to attend a school not in their attendance area. Such permission is granted
by school authorities upon a proper showing, based on their established
standards. It conclusively appears from the testimony that the standards
applicable for special transfer, which do not include any considerations
of race, have been adhered to in every respect. "4
The court then in approving the neighborhood school policy pointed
out that this was in no fashion contradictory to the Constitution, but in
fact was in accord and compatible with the requirements of the Con-
stitution.
41
Thus, the lower court decisions support the principle that the Con-
stitution does not provide for affirmative integration of a school comprised
of primarily one race when there was no state action to effectuate a policy
of racial segregation.
In the Supreme Court the question has similarly been answered in
the negative as to whether or not there is an affirmative duty to integrate.
In the first Broum v. Board of Educatio42 decision, in 1954, no view
was expressed when pupils are not assigned solely on the basis of the
locality in which they reside. The court stated: "Does segregation of
children in public schools solely on the basis of race . . . deprive the
children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities? We
believe that it does." 43 The court did not go any further than this.
Then in the second opinion in 1955, in remanding to the district
courts involved, the court said: "The courts may consider problems related
to administration, arising from the physical condition of the school plant,
the school transportation system, personnel, revision of school districts
and attendance areas into compact units to achieve a system of deter-
mining admission to the public schools on a non-racial basis, and revision
39 Ibid.
40 Id. at 91.
41 Ibid.
42347 U. S. 483 (1954).
43 Id. at 493.
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of local laws and regulations which may be necessary in solving the fore-
going problems.' 44
But it was the final result in the Brown case that points up the fact
that there is no affirmative duty to integrate; for the final plan approved
by the district court read as follows: "If it is a fact, as we understand
it is with respect to Buchanan School that the district is inhabited entirely
by colored students, no violation of any constitutional right results because
they are compelled to attend the school in the district in which they live."
45
As a matter of fact in the City of Topeka today 11 out of 60 of the schools
are still all Negro, after five years of desegregation in the city where the
model for desegregation was laid down.
4 6
The result based on the Supreme Court decisions to date, and the
lower court opinions, leave us with an interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment that requires desegregation where there has in fact been racial
segregation on the part of the state or its agents in a state supported
school, but that there is no affirmative duty to integrate or desegregate a
school or schools whose student body represent primarily a single race
where the reason for the minority group's primary representation in the
school is not due to a state's intentional plan or scheme to effectuate
racial segregation.
Thus, the Taylor decision cannot constitutionally be interpreted to
stand for the premise that whenever a state supported school is repre-
sented primarily by a single racial group there is an affirmative duty to
desegregate, or integrate. It must then follow that the designation of the
school an individual is to attend based on a non-racially motivated neigh-
borhood school policy is not in contravention of the United States Con-
stitution.
QUOTA SYSTEMS AND AFFIRMATIVE INTFPRATION
An important basis of the district court's decision in the Taylor case
is a finding that constitutionally required equality in schooling cannot
be achieved unless there is not merely some integration but some con-
siderable proportion of white children mixed with Negro children. Thus,
the district judge in his findings of fact criticized the school board be-
cause ". . . in these eleven years, it has taken no action whatsoever to alter
the racial imbalance in the Lincoln School. ,147 He quoted extensively and
44 349 U. S. 294, at 300 (1955).
45 139 F. Supp. 468, at 470 (D. C. Kan. 1955).
46 Taylor v. Board of Education of New Rochelle, 294 F. 2d 36, at 47 (2d Cir.
1961). (Moore, J., Dissenting).
47 191 F. Supp. 181, at 187 (S. D. N. Y. 1961).
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with obvious approval a report advocating eradication of ". . . the im-
balance of races in the Lincoln School.' '48 He interpreted Brown as
holding that the ". . . necessity of giving these minority-group children
the opportunity for extensive contact with other children at an early
state in their educational experience ' 4 9 was constitutionally mandatory.
He held that "The fact that the Lincoln School contains approximately
6% whites surely cannot divest Lincoln of its segregated character. In a
community such as New Rochelle, the presence of some 29 white children
certainly does not afford the 454 Negro children in the school the educa-
tional and social contacts and interaction envisioned by Brown."50 And
finally, he reemphasized his view that only Negroes were entitled to such a
quota system by rejecting the school board's argument that to permit
Negro students to transfer when members of other groups could not would
".. . accord Negroes special privileges" by stating that "the Constitution
is not this color-blind" and that the "Brown decision dealt only with
Negroes. "151
The issue was drawn even more sharply in the Court of Appeals. In
his first dissent, Judge Moore asked ". . how many additional white
children will be required to accomplish the result" of an adequate racial
balance ?52 He also stated that " '. . . when all the racial, religious, and
other imbalances' have been thoroughly aired . . . the hope is expressed
that somehow the American philosophy, that constitutional rights are the
vested heritage of all our citizens and not the exclusive property of any
racial or religious group to be used for their own particular interests, may
find its way into the plan-even if only in a footnote." 5 3
In his second dissent, Judge Moore declared that ". . . the trial court
turned the case from a segregated school case into an integration case"
because ". . there was no proof whatsoever of segregation; there was
proof of racial imbalance in various sections of the city. ' 54  Pointing
out that one school was over 90% Jewish and one over 90% Italian, 55 Judge
Moore declared:
"The 'equal protection' rights of all the other school children of New
Rochelle are completely disregarded. How can a permissive transfer
48 Id. at 189.
49 Id. at 192.
50 Id. at 193.
51 Id. at 196.
52 Taylor v. Board of Education of New Rochelle, 288 F. 2d 600, at 607 (2d Cir.
1961) (Moore, J., Dissenting).
53 Id. at 607.
54 Supra note 46, at 43.
55 Id. at 42.
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policy be granted only to one out of twelve districts? . . . If concen-
tration of any one group is 'segregation' (and hence a constitutional
violation), why should not the Jewish or Italian child be given equal
privileges to transfer? If, as represented, Columbus is in a depressed
economic area and over 90% Italian, is not the proper education of a
child as important to a resident of the Columbus district as the Lincoln
district?' ',
Thus, the underlying issue in Taylor was sharply drawn as to whether
there is a constitutional requirement that the school board use a "quota
system" whereby there would be a fixed percentage of Negroes and whites
in each school, and whether only Negroes are entitled to the benefits of
this quota system.
As to the first branch of inquiry, Supreme Court decisions leave little
doubt that quota systems are constitutionally obnoxious. In Hughes v.
Superior Court,5 7 Mr. Justice Frankfurter declared:
"To deny California the right to ban picketing in the circumstances
of this case would mean that there could be no prohibition of the
pressure of picketing to secure proportional employment on ancestral
grounds of Hungarians in Cleveland, of Poles in Buffalo, of Germans
in Milwaukee, of Portuguese in New Bedford, of Mexicans in San
Antonio, of the numerous minority groups in New York, and so on
through the whole gamut of racial and religious concentrations in
various cities. States may well believe that such constitutional shelter-
ing would inevitably encourage use of picketing to compel employment
on the basis of racial discrimination. "58
Likewise, in Cassel v. Texas,59 the Supreme Court stated that "propor-
tional representation of races on a jury is not a constitutional requisite"
and that since there can be no discrimination because of color, "propor-
tional limitation is not permissible. "' The same thing was condemned
in Brown v. Allen. , '
Quota systems have also been condemned by both cases and legal
commentators. 62  In a recent decision, a federal district court in Illinois
observed:
56 Id. at 50.
57 339 U. S. 460 (1950).
58 Id. at 464.
59 339 U. S. 282 (1950).
60 Id. at 286-7.
61344 U. S. 443 (1953).
62 Note, 107 U. Pa. L. Rev. 515, 540-50 (1959) ; 70 Yale L. J. 126 (1960) Taylor
v. Leonard, 30 N. J. Super, 116, 103 A. 2d 632 (1954).
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"A controlled integration plan with discriminatory restrictions . . .
would amount to a quota system of housing and that is just as illegal
as the quota system of employment that a group of Negroes sought to
enforce on a department store in ... Hughes v. Superior Court . . . in
that case, the Supreme Court . . . (said) :
'If petitioners were upheld in their demand then other races,
white, yellow, brown, and red, would have equal rights to demand
discriminatory living on a racial basis. Yet that is precisely the type
of discrimination to which petitioners avowedly object.' . . .
True, plaintiffs' plan may appear attractive to Negroes at the
particular moment in a particular place, but it would constitute a
strait jacket. It is but a mess of pottage offered in exchange for a
birthright of equality. "3
The second branch of inquiry is equally free from doubt. The Civil
Rights Act of 1866, from which the Fourteenth Amendment is derived,
"applies to white men as well as black men. It declares that all persons
in the United States shall be entitled to the same Civil Rights. "6 The
legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment is thus clear on this
point. And in one of the earliest cases interpreting the equal protection
63Progress Development Corp. v. Mitchell, 182 F. Supp. 681, 707 (N. D. Ill.,
1960) ; modified on other grounds, 286 F. 2d 222 (1961).
64 Statement of Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois, Cong. Globe. 39th Cong.,
1st Sess. 599 (1866). Senator Jacob Merritt Howard from Michigan stated when
arging for the adoption of the last two clauses of Sec. 1 of the proposed Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution:
"[The Fourth Article and the sixth of the first ten amendments to the United
States Constitution] . . . stand simply as a bill of rights in the Constitution
without power on the part of Congress to give them full effect; while at the
same time the States are not restrained from violating the principles embraced
in them except by their own local constitutions which may be altered from year
to year. The great object of the first section of this amendment is, therefore,
to restrain the power of the states and compell them at all times to respect
these fundamental guarantees."
* * * * *
"This (Sec. 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment) abolishes all class legislation
in the States and does away with the injustice of subjecting one caste of
persons to a code not applicable to another."
"Ought not the time be now passed when one measure of justice is to be
meted out to members of one caste while another and different measure is
meted out to members of another caste, both castes being alike citizens of
the United States, both bound to obey the same laws, to sustain the burdens
of the same government, and equally responsible to justice and God for the
deeds done in the body?"
It establishes equality before the law and gives to the humblest . .
the same rights and the same protection before the law as it gives to the most
powerful, the most wealthy, or the most haughty." Id., at 2766.
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clause, the Supreme Court declared that its ". . . provisions are universal
in their application ... without regard to any differences of race, of color,
or of nationality. "65
It is obvious from the above that all persons are entitled to the same
rights and none are entitled to special privileges. Negroes may not be
accorded any advantage not accorded to all other persons. No matter
what the semantic dressing, if the bare bones of any proposal give one iota
of right more to any group not accorded to any other, the proposal violates
fundamental tenets of equality. As one writer put it:
"Likewise, Mr. Greenberg is vitally concerned because a substantial
number of northern schools have a Negro majority, and he considers
such schools ipso facto inferior. He would like to use all sorts of
means to maintain proper racial 'balance'. But what about schools
with Irish, Italian, Jewish, Polish, and other majorities? Indeed,
the year this reviewer went to Columbia Law School, his class was
about 60 per cent Jewish. Is Columbia University Law School a
psychologically inferior institution? Are Jewish graduates thereof
getting shortchanged? Must we inaugurate helicopter service from
the University of Virginia to maintain proper religious 'balance'?
Or are Negroes entitled to special privileges once again ?"66
The above points were brought into sharp focus by one New York case
in which a group of Negroes in New York's Harlem picketed white owned
liquor stores there to replace white liquor salesmen with Negroes. In
banning the picketing, a New York judge declared:
"Insistence upon compliance with the policy of the law bespeaks con-
sistency in application to all. It is not a one way proposition for
Negroes alone, it is rather for equal application to all. There can
be no two ways, one liberal policy for a single race, and for all others,
to limbo. This accepted policy of the State can not be circumscribed
so as to restrict its application only to those who invoke it. It applies
universally to all races and creeds. In the latter respect, rightfully,
no racial group may be characterized as a minority. No Constitution,
no law, makes such a distinction. "7
65 Yick Ho v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1885).
66 Avins, Book Review, 27 U. Chi. L. Rev. 598, 599 (1960).
67 In re Young, 29 Misc. 2d 817, 211 N. Y. S. 2d 621, 632-3 (1961).
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CONCLUSION
At the present time in the City of Chicago, there is a class action
brought by James and Andrea Webb as members of a class and represent-
ing the class, against the School Board of the City.68 Almost identical with
the Taylor case discussed above, the action in Chicago maintains the same
two major premises, that the school districts are purposely altered, and
were originally set up to initiate and maintain segregation; and that the
neighborhood school policy when it results in primarily all Negro schools,
though the result was not designed or intentional, and may be due to
large groups moving into a given area, is still in contravention of the
Fourteenth Amendment since there is an affirmative duty to integrate on
the part of state authorities.
In the Chicago case the Superintendent of Schools has denied that
the districts comprising the complained of neighborhood schools were
designed to effectuate segregation.69 Of course, these factual questions
will be decided by the court and are beyond the scope of this article.
However, it is believed that insofar as this, or any other litigation, attempts
to urge any affirmative duty to integrate or to treat any group differently
from any other group, such litigation is not well founded in law. The





68 Webb v. Board of Education, No. 61 Civ. 15689, N. D. Ill., Sept. 1961.
69 Affidavit In Answer to Affidavit of Paul B. Zuber, by Benjamin C. Willis as
general superintendent of public schools of the City of Chicago, in Webb v. Board
of Education, supra, n. 68.
